Utvidet returrett til 31. januar 2025

Capacity Allocation Mechanisms and Coordination in Supply Chain Under Demand Competition

Om Capacity Allocation Mechanisms and Coordination in Supply Chain Under Demand Competition

This book aims at providing cases with inspiring findings for global researchers in capacity allocation and reservation. Capacity allocation mechanisms are introduced in the book, as well as the measures to build models and the ways to achieve supply chain coordination. In addition, it illustrates the capacity reservation contract and quantity flexible contract with comparisons and some numerical studies. The book is divided into 7 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background and the latest development of the research. Chapter 2 introduces how to manage downstream competition through capacity allocation in symmetric market, including proportional mechanism and lexicographic mechanism. Demand competition is introduced in Chapter 3 as well as the uniform allocation mechanism and the comparisons among three different mechanisms. In Chapter 4, we give information about demand competition with fixed factor allocation, and the comparison with other allocations. Chapter 5 provides the optimal strategies under fixed allocation with multiple retailers and the impacts of fixed proportions. Chapter 6 illustrates how to achieve supply chain coordination through capacity reservation contract and its comparison with the quantity flexibility contract, and in Chapter 7 we describe outsourcing decisions and order policies in different systems with some numerical studies. We sincerely hope that this book can provide some useful suggestions and inspirations for scholars around the world who have the same interests in this field.

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  • Språk:
  • Engelsk
  • ISBN:
  • 9789811965791
  • Bindende:
  • Paperback
  • Sider:
  • 264
  • Utgitt:
  • 2. november 2023
  • Utgave:
  • 23001
  • Dimensjoner:
  • 155x15x235 mm.
  • Vekt:
  • 406 g.
  • BLACK NOVEMBER
  Gratis frakt
Leveringstid: 2-4 uker
Forventet levering: 7. desember 2024

Beskrivelse av Capacity Allocation Mechanisms and Coordination in Supply Chain Under Demand Competition

This book aims at providing cases with inspiring findings for global researchers in capacity allocation and reservation. Capacity allocation mechanisms are introduced in the book, as well as the measures to build models and the ways to achieve supply chain coordination. In addition, it illustrates the capacity reservation contract and quantity flexible contract with comparisons and some numerical studies. The book is divided into 7 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background and the latest development of the research. Chapter 2 introduces how to manage downstream competition through capacity allocation in symmetric market, including proportional mechanism and lexicographic mechanism. Demand competition is introduced in Chapter 3 as well as the uniform allocation mechanism and the comparisons among three different mechanisms. In Chapter 4, we give information about demand competition with fixed factor allocation, and the comparison with other allocations. Chapter 5 provides the optimal strategies under fixed allocation with multiple retailers and the impacts of fixed proportions. Chapter 6 illustrates how to achieve supply chain coordination through capacity reservation contract and its comparison with the quantity flexibility contract, and in Chapter 7 we describe outsourcing decisions and order policies in different systems with some numerical studies. We sincerely hope that this book can provide some useful suggestions and inspirations for scholars around the world who have the same interests in this field.

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