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Maintaining and even increasing force readiness in light of changing climate threats is a key part of meeting high-level U.S. strategic goals. In this report, researchers describe a study they conducted to develop links between climate and readiness.

The focus on efficiency in combatant command combat operations has driven peacetime logistics and sustainment processes to be more centralized in the U.S. Air Force and, in some cases, at the U.S. Department of Defense level. In some instances, the centralization placed decision authorities associated with the allocation and reallocation of resources outside the control of warfighting commands. Additionally, the move toward efficiency has created a lean supply chain that relies on assured transportation to rapidly deliver resources where needed based on demand signals from end-users. Capable adversaries, however, can disrupt the supply chain by degrading communications and limiting access to forward locations. As Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) pursues evolving operational concepts of employment designed to improve operational resiliency, questions about the fragility of the combat support (CS) enterprise persist. In light of these questions, Headquarters PACAF asked RAND Project AIR FORCE to take a holistic view of the CS enterprise, including base, theater, and global resources, and explore different concepts that could be integrated in theater sustainment plans to support operations. In this report, the authors decompose the CS enterprise from decision authority and resource characteristic perspectives and propose a framework that PACAF can use to consider the necessary elements of the CS enterprise for operating in a hybrid push-pull system as a means to mitigate uncertainty and adversary actions that challenge logistics support. The report also presents the cost of various resource buffer strategies for spare parts.

This report explores where the United States, China, and Russia may be competing for influence in secondary theaters; where and why competition might turn to conflict; what form that conflict might take; and implications for the United States.

To inform a project on the aftermath of great power wars, the author examined ten conflicts since 1853. This volume presents brief historical summaries and assesses past forecasts of the duration, intensity, stakes, and consequences of each war.

RAND researchers generated four plausible near-term great power war scenarios and assessed how they could shape the postwar strategic environment.

"This report examines how U.S.-China rivalry might unfold under conditions characterized by a blend of some aspects of modern life with a much more substantial attenuation or regression of other aspects, a condition the authors label neomedievalism. The report outlines key trends that collectively suggest that the future of the U.S.-China rivalry will bear little resemblance to the titanic struggles of the past two centuries. U.S.-China peacetime competition appears headed to unfold under conditions featuring a high degree of international disorder, decaying state capacity, pervasive and acute domestic challenges, and severe constraints imposed by economic and social factors that are vastly different from those industrial nation-states experienced in the 19th and 20th centuries. These trends interact with and compound the effects of one another and are unlikely to be reversed. The net effect will be to considerably weaken virtually all states, including the United States and China. At the same time, severe resource constraints and a nearly overwhelming array of threats will stress the U.S. and China militaries and impair their ability to contend with one another. Many theories and ideas of why and how great powers compete may need to be reconsidered."--

Whenever and however Russia's invasion of Ukraine ultimately ends, the U.S.-Russia relationship is likely to remain hostile in its aftermath. Over the long term, however, the United States will have incentives to reduce the risks and costs of its relationship with Russia in order to focus on other challenges, such as China. Future U.S. policymakers might therefore wish to again consider a limited less-hardline approach toward Russia. Supporters of such approaches contend that limited less-hardline approaches can reduce an adversary's insecurity, moderate its behavior, and reduce the costs and risks associated with competition between the two countries. Critics are reluctant to make concessions to U.S. rivals and worry that softening the U.S. stance could embolden a rival to become more demanding and aggressive. The authors used four historical case studies of limited less-hardline approaches with strategic similarities to the U.S.-Russia relationship before the war in Ukraine to evaluate these competing claims. These cases were (1) negotiations between Britain and Russia over Central Asia from 1899 to 1914 (2) U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the post-World War II order from 1945 to 1946, (3) the U.S.-Soviet dâetente from 1969 to 1975, and (4) the U.S.-Russia reset from 2009-2013. The authors found that such approaches have led to durable but narrow gains without emboldening the rival to be more demanding or aggressive. These limited policies also have limited effects. They only reduce a rival's threat perceptions modestly and do not prevent future deterioration of the relationship over outstanding conflicts of interest.

Disrupting the financing that violent nonstate actors require is critical for degrading such groups. This report examines the methods used to disrupt this financing and how the Army can contribute to the effort.

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) installations have been affected by extreme weather events, such as wind and flood damage from Hurricane Sally at Naval Air Station Pensacola and flooding from severe storms at Offutt Air Force Base. More-frequent and less-extreme events, such as recurrent flooding or hailstorms, also disrupt DoD missions and result in considerable financial loss. DoD needs a way to compare the damage costs resulting from extreme weather events against the costs of mitigating that damage through enhanced installation resilience. There is currently no DoD-validated model or method for systematically comparing climate hazard damage costs against the costs of investing in resilience options. This report begins to address this gap by assessing the relevance and limitations of this one analytic approach. Climate change is likely to increase the frequency and/or severity of extreme weather events, but it is difficult to predict with certainty which installations will be hit and when, or even by what type of hazard. It is important for DoD to account for this uncertainty by setting priorities for where and how much to invest in installation resilience to climate-driven hazards. Tools such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency's natural hazard analysis tool (Hazus) could be used to further understanding of the value of investing in installation resilience to climate-driven hazards. In 19 case studies, the annualized cost of a resilience option was compared with the averted damage over that option's lifetime under a variety of disaster scenarios to screen for potentially attractive resilience investment options.

To develop and harness technological capabilities to meet its missions, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) seeks ways to improve acquisition and retention of technical talent from science, technical, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) disciplines. Congress and DoD policymakers point to higher compensation in the private sector as a key challenge. However, a prior RAND Corporation report suggests that the average compensation difference between private- and public-sector STEM workers is not that large when workforce characteristics are considered. This same research shows that there are demographic-group differences (gender, racial and ethnic) in compensation for STEM workers. Given Congressional and DoD interest in employing more STEM workers-and federal government interest in promoting diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility more generally-demographic-group differences in the DoD STEM workforce warrant in-depth understanding. Building on previous RAND research, the authors use several years of DoD civilian workforce data to quantify trends in demographic-group compensation differences and other employment-related outcomes among the DoD civilian STEM workforce. The authors provide an overview of the composition of the DoD civilian STEM workforce, then perform an analysis that controls for observable characteristics, such as education, that might explain those group differences. Next, they describe the compensation implications of the demographic composition of civilian pay plans and explore compensation differences while holding DoD component, geographic location, and STEM occupational category constant. They conclude with key findings and recommendations for DoD to better understand and address demographic-related inequalities within its STEM workforce.

In the wake of the Taliban takeover and the reestablishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in August 2021, there are significant questions about the best methods to interpret Taliban messaging. Better interpretation would, in turn, help U.S. and Western policymakers to better understand Taliban leadership intentions and would thus allow for better-informed U.S. and Western policy decisions regarding Afghanistan. Limited direct diplomatic contact between the Taliban and most Western governments necessitates reliance on alternative sources of information. Taliban use of social media, particularly Twitter, was identified as one way to understand Taliban thinking. The authors of this report examine Taliban leadership use of Twitter in various regional languages and in English. Focusing on three areas-the economy, relationships with other militant groups and neighboring countries, and the status of women in Afghan society-the authors sought to clarify the messaging broadcast via this medium and to determine whether messaging differed by language used. The authors found no overall strategy behind Taliban social media use and no strong evidence that Taliban social media activity is coordinated at a high level. Messages appear designed to inform, persuade, and influence a target audience. On some issues, messaging was common across languages; in other cases, the messages were distinctly different, reflecting Taliban interest in tailoring a message for a specific audience without regard to potential contradictions by other individuals or among the various languages.

The Great Recession began in 2007, when a contraction in the U.S. housing market led to widespread losses in the financial sector and, subsequently, to economic shocks around the world. By December 2007, the country was officially in recession, and it would not emerge from this contraction for 18 months. Although national security decisionmaking was not immediately affected by the recession, uncertainties created by short-term political measures to address the deficit meant that DoD had to fundamentally reconsider its ways and means of ensuring national security in the 2010s. This history considers the Great Recession's reverberations on the DoD as senior leaders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff worked to shift from a decade of counterterrorism operations toward future threats amid a dynamic threat environment and budgetary uncertainty.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) provides a suite of grants to help strengthen U.S. communities against terrorist attacks. To inform grant resource allocation decisions, FEMA has developed and maintains a risk-based formula to assess relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences of terrorist attacks in states and major urban areas. The formula helps FEMA decide how to use finite resources for the grant programs. As a result of the evolving threat landscape and as part of ongoing efforts to improve administration of the grant program, FEMA is performing a comprehensive review of the risk formula. As part of this review, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) asked the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC) to conduct an independent review of HSGP's risk formula and data sources. To assess the grant program's risk formula, the research team evaluated the data elements and sources in each component of the terrorism risk formula, reviewed the mathematical calculations used in the risk methodology, and considered alternative data elements and sources to account for the evolving threat environment. The evaluation framework used in this study addresses the formula's compliance with the program's authorizing language, legitimacy to stakeholders, and the validity and simplicity of the risk formula. The review suggests alternative approaches FEMA could consider to improve the risk formula and to address additional dimensions, such as community resilience and equity.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has hypothesized that the demand signal for uncrewed systems (UxS) in the coming years will strain the capacity of the U.S. defense industrial base (DIB). DoD asked the RAND Corporation to explore this possibility and assemble relevant risks, issues, and opportunities to support ongoing DoD activities, including complying with statutory requirements to provide annual reports to Congress. The scope of the request covered many types of UxS, including uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), uncrewed ground systems (UGSs), and maritime platforms-specifically, uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) and uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs). The authors consulted a variety of data sources and conducted interviews with officials from military UxS program offices, representatives from commercial entities, and subject matter experts. They examined fragility indicators, such as financial outlook, DoD sales, the number of firms in relevant sectors, and dependence on foreign sources of supply; and examined criticality indicators, such as defense uniqueness, design requirements, skilled labor needs, facility and equipment availability, materials and components with long lead times, and availability of alternatives. This report contains an analysis of required levels of autonomous UxS to meet DIB requirements, data on DIB categories and specific component elements within those categories, an assessment of the posture of the DIB to produce and sustain levels of UxS platforms as required by DoD, the results of a comparative analysis of near-peer nation-states China and Russia, and recommendations on strengthening the DIB.

Federal, state, and local initiatives have encouraged education and training providers to build stackable credentials, a series of postsecondary credentials that can be earned over time and build on each other. By offering flexible pathways that allow individuals to earn credentials incrementally and work as they earn credentials, stackable credentials can advance educational and economic opportunity for low-income individuals and other groups that have not been well-served in traditional degree programs. However, there is limited evidence on whether low-income individuals benefit from stacking credentials, and whether low-income individuals face systemic barriers to accessing stackable credential pipelines. In this report, the authors use a mixed methods approach to examine stackable credential equity in Colorado and Ohio-two states pursuing stackable credential initiatives. The authors analyze administrative data to describe patterns in credential stacking and earnings for low-income individuals relative to middle- and high-income individuals. They identify four potential systemic barriers to equity within stackable credential pipelines, and interview key stakeholders to learn more about factors contributing to these barriers. The authors conclude by discussing options to ensure equitable opportunities to stack credentials across fields of study and institutions.

RAND researchers assessed the progress that the commercial spaceflight industry has made in adopting voluntary safety standards and whether the industry has reached a level of maturity such that certain areas are ready for regulatory action.

The authors identify unmet needs for transitioning reserve component members, assess the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), and recommend ways to improve TAP's effectiveness in addressing reserve component members' transition needs.

With the emergence of strategic competition with near peers as the defining U.S. national security priority in recent years, the U.S. Army has had to rethink its roles and responsibilities. Competition requires strategies, approaches, and missions different from those developed for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, which have been the focus of the past two decades. Many Army missions and capabilities are relevant here, but for the Army to succeed in competition against near peers, it must work in an integrated fashion with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and other U.S. government entities. The objective of this research was to identify how the Army can make or influence procedural and/or organizational changes to help tailor DoD processes for competition and to identify existing Army capabilities that could be more fully used and understood in competition. The authors reviewed the relevant literature, authorities, policy, and historical cases; interviewed subject-matter experts; and conducted a systematic analysis of overlaps between the existing supply of Army capabilities and the demands of competition below the threshold of armed conflict. Among other things, the authors found that relevant Army organizations are not always incentivized to tailor their contributions to support broader DoD competition activities. The best opportunities for the Army to contribute to competition efforts, moreover, may not be in its areas of historical focus or competency.

National security organizations need highly skilled and intellectually creative individuals who are eager to apply their talents to address the nation's most pressing challenges. In public and private discussions, officials and experts addressed the need for neurodiversity in the national security community. They described missions that are too important and too difficult to be left to those who use their brains only in typical ways. Neurodivergent is an umbrella term that covers a variety of cognitive diagnoses, including (but not exclusive to) autism spectrum disorder, attention deficit disorder (ADD) and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), dyslexia, dyscalculia, and Tourette's syndrome. Neurodivergent individuals are already part of the national security workforce. The purpose of this report is to understand the benefits that people with neurodivergence bring to national security; the challenges in recruiting, working with, and managing a neurodiverse workforce; and the barriers in national security workplaces that prevent agencies from realizing the full benefits of neurodiversity. To carry out this research, the authors conducted a review of primary, secondary, and commercial literature; they conducted semistructured interviews and held discussions with government officials, researchers and advocates for the interests of neurodivergent populations, and representatives from large organizations that have neurodiversity employment programs; and they synthesized findings from across these tasks to describe the complex landscape for neurodiversity in large organizations in general and in national security specifically.

In this report, the authors develop a foundational text for policymakers and warfighters to improve collective understanding of the Russian General Staff, including its capacity to condition Russia's national security decisionmaking process.

The authors explore Russian views on the military applications of robotics and artificial intelligence and how they differ from the United States' views on the matter. They assess whether Moscow has delivered-or can deliver-its robotization vision.

Historically, logistics are often ignored or abstracted at a very high level during operational wargames, even though the ability to resupply units is vital for waging and winning a war in the real world. This report details a logistics game design that reflects the complexity of logistics systems without requiring computer aids, which can be too time-consuming to use during game adjudication and may require technology that is not available in secure game venues. This game design is flexible enough to accommodate a variety of scenarios, objectives, and modifications. It lends itself particularly well to scenarios in which resources are limited or unexpected obstacles could appear, including nonmilitary scenarios. Its potential uses include exploring new concepts of operations, illuminating vulnerabilities in logistics networks, understanding the dynamics of supply movements, highlighting the broader impacts of logistics planning, and brainstorming solutions to challenges.

Patterns and consequences of opioid use are changing dramatically. Researchers provide a nuanced assessment of America's opioid ecosystem, highlighting how leveraging system interactions can reduce addiction, overdose, suffering, and other harms.

The authors used quantitative analysis and case studies of China, Iran, and Russia to examine the causes and likely future trends in proxy wars: civil wars in which at least one local warring party receives material support from an external state.

"This report documents findings and recommendations from a project examining how Department of Defense (DoD) innovation organizations can more effectively create and strengthen a "commercial technology pipeline" through which innovative commercial technologies can be identified, developed, and transitioned from the private sector to DoD for military use at both the Joint and Service level"--

As the anticipated character of warfare changes, new operational concepts emerge in response to new needs, and training must also adapt to support these concepts and ensure readiness. Given the speed at which concepts develop and the length of time it may take to adapt training after the fact, it is prudent to assess training capabilities and practices as concepts mature rather than after concepts have been fully operationalized. Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is emerging as the preeminent operational concept in the U.S. Department of Defense. It is intended to improve situational awareness, improve abilities to direct forces across domains and services, and facilitate rapid decisionmaking. Distributed sensors, shooters, and data from all domains are connected to joint forces, enabling coordinated exercise of authority to integrate planning and synchronize convergence in time, space, and purpose. However, JADC2 is under development by all the services as well as the Joint Staff, and therefore, plans for its execution are not yet mature. It is a complex and networked concept, and training to support this concept will require preemptive consideration of supporting capabilities, especially when considering continuation training for personnel at air operation centers (AOCs). Live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) simulations can help support the complex training that JADC2 will require, but proper development and deployment will require aligning training processes, LVC capabilities, and JADC2 training needs. Drawing from documentation review and interviews with subject-matter experts, the authors develop a road map to leverage LVC in support of JADC2 training.

This applied research project provides the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing (SSC) Performance Accountability Council Program Management Office (PAC PMO) with an examination of how U.S. government vetting processes and procedures could be enhanced by application of mobile technologies and platforms. The research team identified key mobile platform and security factors to consider when communicating with and screening candidates within the SSC process. This report also describes relevant private-sector practices on talent acquisition, applicant tracking systems, screening methods, and communication strategies with candidates prior to the onboarding process. The RAND research team performed the following tasks for the PAC PMO: (1) categorize emerging mobile technology platforms according to SSC process relevance and ability to assist government vetting of personnel; (2) illustrate relevant practices and lessons learned for integrating security applications with mobile platforms; and (3) provide recommendations on how best to incorporate potentially useful private-sector screening practices to create efficiency within initial stages of the SSC process.

This report, part of a four-part series, describes the potential for U.S. cooperation with China or Russia in Europe and the Middle East across seven issue areas.

If there is a set of issues where great power cooperation could be most likely, it should be in the global commons. Global commons issues are-by definition-shared by multiple nations. As part of a broader study of great power cooperation in an era of strategic competition, the authors assessed the potential for U.S. cooperation with China or Russia on eight global commons issues: maintaining freedom of access to space, dismantling transnational criminal organizations/networks, countering violent extremist organizations, promoting global stability, preserving access to the air and maritime commons, preventing nuclear arms races, preventing militarization of the Arctic, and maintaining the openness of cyberspace. The authors sought to understand where the United States, China, and Russia share interests on these issues, what the obstacles to cooperation are, and where the United States might be able to deepen its cooperation with one or both powers. The authors find that the trade space for cooperation is already narrow and usually focused more on civilian aspects of these domains rather than core security matters. In general, there is more room for the United States to cooperate with Russia than with China, and there are significant obstacles to cooperation, with a lack of trust being the most common. Finally, cooperation produces both positive and negative externalities, and the costs of cooperation do not always outweigh the likely benefits.

Can the United States find ways to cooperate with China or Russia in the Indo-Pacific, either to temper geopolitical rivalry or as a strategy to use cooperation with one of the two countries as an advantage against the other? Using official U.S., Chinese, and Russian policy documents, leadership statements, and other sources, the authors of this report assess the prospects for great power cooperation on seven issues: securing a free and open Indo-Pacific, ensuring the defense of key allies and partners, expanding cooperation with new partners in Southeast Asia, ensuring peace in the Taiwan Strait, achieving the denuclearization of North Korea, countering terrorism, and deepening U.S. geostrategic ties with India. The authors find that, because of the divergence in the three countries' strategic views and policy goals, there is little room for U.S. cooperation with China or Russia in the Indo-Pacific. This implies that cooperation in order to tamp down competitive pressures or to drive wedges between Beijing and Moscow is an unpromising approach to managing ties or competition with these great powers. Instead, the United States will be better off focusing on preparations for long-term competition than striving to turn Beijing and Moscow against each other. This research was completed in September 2020, before the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and before the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. It has not been subsequently revised.