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One of the most difficult security challenges of the post-Cold War era has been stabilizing failing states in an era of irregular warfare. A consistent component of the strategy to address this problem has been security force assistance where outside powers train and advise the host nation's military. Despite billions of dollars spent, the commitment of thousands of advisors, and innumerable casualties, the American efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq failed catastrophically. Nevertheless, among those colossal military disasters were pockets of success. The Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) held back the Islamic State in 2014 long enough to allow American and allied forces to flow back into the country, and many Afghan commando units fought to the bitter end as their country disintegrated around them. What made those units successful while the larger missions ended disastrously? Author Frank K. Sobchak explores security force assistance across five case studies, examining what factors were most critical for U.S. Special Forces units to build capable partners like the ISOF and the commandos. More specifically, the book assesses the impact of five components of Special Forces advisory missions: language training and cultural awareness of the advising force; the partner force-to-advisor ratio; the advisors' ability to organize host-nation forces; whether advisors are permitted to guide in combat; and the consistency in advisor pairing. Based on the experiences of U.S. Army Special Forces in El Salvador (1981-1991), Colombia (2002-2016), the Philippines (2001-2015), Iraq (2003-2011), and Afghanistan (2007-2021), Sobchak argues that the most crucial factors in producing combat-effective partners are consistency in advisor pairing and maintaining a partner force-to-advisor ratio of twelve special forces soldiers advising a company-sized force or smaller. Intriguingly, and counter to conventional wisdom, at first glance language training and cultural awareness do not seem to be critical factors, as most of the Green Berets that trained units in Iraq and Afghanistan lacked both capabilities. Despite an orthodoxy that argues the opposite, there is little evidence that combat advising is decisive in producing effective partners and there is conflicting evidence that language training and cultural awareness are important. Many of these findings, while focused on Special Forces operations and doctrine, could be used to improve the odds of success for larger security-force assistance missions as well.

On 26 February 1991, cavalry troops of Cougar Squadron, the 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, charged out of a sandstorm during Operation Desert Storm and caught Iraqs Republican Guard Corps in the open desert along the North-South grid line of a military map referred to as the 73 Easting. Taken by surprise, the defending Iraqi armor brigade was swept away in salvos of American tank and missile fire in what became the U.S. Armys largest tank battle since World War II. Douglas Macgregor, the man who trained and led Cougar Squadron into battle, recounts two stories. One is the inspiring tale of the valiant American soldiers, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains who fought and won the battle. The other is a story of failed generalship, one that explains why Iraqs Republican Guard escaped, ensuring that Saddam Husseins regime survived and Americas war with Iraq dragged on. Certain to provoke debate, this is the latest book from the controversial and influential military veteran whose two previous books, Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation Under Fire, are credited with influencing thinking and organization inside Americas ground forces and figure prominently in current discussions about military strategy and defense policies. Its fast-moving battle narrative, told from the vantage point of Macgregors Abrams tank, and its detailed portraits of American soldiers, along with vivid descriptions of the devastating technology of mounted warfare, will captivate anyone with a taste for adventure as well as an interest in contemporary military history.

How does one engage in the study of strategy? Strategy: Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower argues that strategy is not just concerned with amassing knowledge; it is also about recognizing our imperfect understanding of the environment and respecting the complex nature of adaptation to the unforeseen or unexpected. In essence, the strongest strategists are those who commit to an education that cultivates a more holistic and adaptive way of thinking. With that thought in mind, the contributors to Strategy, each a current or former professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, widely considered the Department of Defense's premier school of strategy, offer ways of thinking strategically about a variety of subject matters, from classical history to cyber power. Practitioners in the profession of arms, perhaps more than any other profession, must employ critical thinking where the application of power on land, at sea, in the air, and in space and cyberspace are concerned. Strategy examines various sub-disciplines regarding the use of power, and illuminates different approaches to thinking which have implications beyond the implementation of force.

The U.S. Marine Corps' four-year campaign against al Qaeda in Anbar is a fight certain to take its place next to such legendary clashes as Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Chosin, and Khe Sanh. Its success, the author contends, constituted a major turning point in the Iraq War and helped alter the course of events and set the stage for the Surge in Baghdad a year later. This book brings to light all the decisive details of how the Marines, between 2004 and 2008, adapted and improvised as they applied the hard lessons of past mistakes. In March 2004, when part of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) was deployed to Anbar Province in the heart of the Sunni triangle, the Marines quickly found themselves locked in a bloody test of wills with al Qaeda, and a burgeoning violent insurgency. By the spring of 2006, according to all accounts, enemy violence was skyrocketing, while predictions for any U.S. success were plummeting. But at that same time new counterinsurgency initiatives were put in place when I MEF returned for its second tour in Anbar, and the Marines began to gain control. By September 2008 the fight was over. Richard Shultz, a well-known author and international security studies expert, has thoroughly researched this subject. His book effectively argues the case for the Marines changing the course of the war at Anbar, which is contrary to the conventional wisdom that the Surge was the turning point.

Operation KE explores the air combat that attended the Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal in early 1943a topic which has hitherto received very little attention. Operation KE was successful largely because Japanese strategic planning and tactical execution was basically sound. The traditional view holds that the Japanese got away with the initiative largely because the Americans let them; the U.S. Pacific high command felt it was not worth the effort to try and stop them. The authors contend that this was not entirely the case. They argue that the Cactus Air Force and Guadalcanal-based naval units did their best to disrupt the evacuation, still believing that the Tokyo Express was bringing reinforcements and supplies to the 17th Army. Other US forces in the South Pacific did make a half-hearted and questionably-executed attempt to stop the Japanese, but were bluffed into adopting a "e;wait-and-see"e; posture.Operation KE focuses on the air war fought between the Cactus and US 13th Air Forces on the one hand and the Japanese Navy and Army Air Forces on the other, from mid-December, 1942 to mid-February, 1943. The book scrutinizes the US air strikes against the six KE-related Tokyo Express destroyer runs, plus related air strikes against the Japanese merchant marine, as well as air and naval base-suppression missions undertaken by both sides, to determine what actually happened in order to analyze why the Japanese evacuation succeeded and why Cactus failed to stop it. Background chapters attempt to assess the respective states of readiness of the Japanese and US air arms in the South Pacific to support on the one hand and counter on the other the execution of Operation KE.The central portion of the book narrates in some detail what actually occurred in the air and at sea -- including air strikes, fighter sweeps, base suppression missions, and naval sorties -- during the crucial prelude to and the actual playing out of the interrelated events that comprised the evacuation operation. Concluding chapters analyze, on both strategic and tactical levels, the Japanese planning and execution of Operation KE, and Cactus' initiatives to interdict KE's successful prosecution. The authors conclude that both the Japanese and the American states of readiness on the eve of Operation KE suffered in such matters as optimizing both resources and operating procedures, and combating a hostile environment. Consequently, both combatants were somewhat handicapped in their abilities respectively to carry out and contest Operation KE.The author contends that the Japanese developed a reasonably sound strategy that exploited those methods and tools of war then in use in the South Pacific; to achieve success, they maximized their own strengths while taking advantage of their adversary's limitations. Contrary to the traditional view, the authors are of the opinion that Japanese utilization of their newly-built airstrip at Munda in the Central Solomons played an important role in the success of Operation KE, which was in keeping with the long-range intention of developing Munda and Vila airstrips as major forward airbases to defend against any Allied push toward Rabaul through the Solomons.The U.S., on the other hand, by consistently misreading Japanese intent regarding Operation KE and pursuing a cautious offensive strategy, blunted the tactical impact of their initiatives to counter the evacuation. Several imprudent tactical decisions and a misallocation of resources further diluted the strength of US efforts.

Six Victories examines one of the most interesting and instructive naval campaigns of World War II: the war on traffic in the Mediterranean during the fall and winter of 1941-42. It is a cautionary tale of how sea power was practiced, and how it shifted 180 degrees overnight. Based on British and Italian archival sources, the book emphasizes strategic context, the role of intelligence, and the campaign's logistics.In October 1941 the British Admiralty based a surface strike force in Malta to attack Axis sea lanes between Italy and Africa. Aided by Ultra intelligence, submarines, and bombers based in Malta, this force dominated the Central Mediterranean. From the end of October through the middle of December 1941, less than a third of the supplies shipped from Italian ports arrived in Libya. Shortages of ammunition and fuel finally compelled the Afrika Korps to retreat four hundred miles. Then, in the space of thirty hours, this all changed. First, Italian naval forces broke the blockade by fighting through a major convoy that arrived in time to blunt the British advance; next, the strike force plowed into a minefield laid by Italian cruisers; and finally, in a daring attack, Italian commandos crippled the Mediterranean Fleet's battleships in port. The swing in fortune was immediate and dramatic.Six Victories breaks new ground in the historiography of World War II. A compelling story, it relates lessons that are relevant today and should be required reading for all who practice the art of power at sea and for those who want to understand the intricate and interrelated factors that are the foundations of military success.

Less than five years after naval aviation led the forces that defeated Imperial Japan that very organization was in serious trouble. The force had been drastically reduced and, despite the Korean War, growing sentiment supported by no less than the chairman of the Joint Chiefs argued that the new Air Force could do anything naval aviation might be required to do. Meanwhile, the naval aviation mishap rate soared. The very survival of naval aviation was at stake. It took fifty years to turn this around. Today, in spite of hot wars, cold wars, contingencies, and peacetime operations in support of friends and allies, the Navy and Marine Corps accident rate is at least as good as that of the Air Force, and it approaches that of commercial aviation. Gear Up, Mishaps Down explains that this accomplishment was achieved through dedicated and professional leadership, a focus on lessons learned from mishaps and near-mishaps, a willingness to learn from other enterprises, and by better leadership, training, maintenance, supply and more.

This book addresses three important facets of Chinas modern development. First is the ongoing modernization of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The Chinese navy has grown from a relatively small, backward force in the 1980s into a capable twenty-first century maritime power. The PLAN now deploys around the world and includes nuclear-powered submarines, the first of several aircraft carriers, modern guided missile destroyers and frigates, and the worlds most formidable force of seagoing cruise and ballistic missiles. This modern, growing navy is intended in significant part to undergird Chinas global search for energy sources and security. Beijings determination to maintain its historic economic growth depends on energy security. These two national prioritiesa navy capable of defending Chinas national security and economic interests and secury energy resourcescome together to define and support Chinese foreign policy. This book addresses these three in both global and Asian contextual terms, with special emphasis on relations between China and the United States.

Keep from All Thoughtful Men overturns much accepted historical dogma on how World War II strategy was planned and implemented. It is taken for granted that the Axis powers were defeated by an avalanche of munitions that poured forth from pitiless American factories. So it is amazing that the story of how this "miracle of production" was organized and integrated into Allied strategy and operations remains untold. Keep from All Thoughtful Men is the first book that tells how revolutions in both statistics and finance changed forever the nature of war. While the book relates the overall story of how economics dictated war planning at the highest levels, more specifically it tells how three obscure economists came to have more influence on the conduct of World War II than the Joint Chiefs. Because military historians rarely understand economics and economic historians just as rarely involve themselves with the details of war, there has never been a military history that shows how economics influenced the planning of strategy and the conduct of any war. This is sadly true of even World War II, which has been called by Paul Samuelson, "The Economist's War."

This book is concerned with both the national security concerns of Asian maritime nations and the security of the Asian maritime commons. These are defined as the Pacific and Indian Oceans and associated seas, bays, and gulfs, with their included sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The most useful geographical designation for maritime Asia is the "Indo-Pacific." Bernard Cole provides both a survey of the maritime strategies of the primary nations of the Indo-Pacific region and an evaluation of the domestic and international politics that drive those strategies. The United States, Canada, Russia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, China, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, India, Pakistan, Iran, the smaller Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf states are all surveyed and analyzed. The United States, Japan, China, and India not surprisingly draw the most attention, given their large modern navies and distant strategic reach. The author concludes that the United States remains the dominant maritime power in this huge region, stretching from Canada to the Persian Gulf, despite its lack of a traditionally strong merchant marine. U.S. maritime power remains paramount, due primarily to its dominant navy. The Chinese naval modernization program deservedly receives a good deal of public attention, but Cole argues that on a day-to-day basis the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, as its navy is named, is the most powerful maritime force in Far Eastern waters, while the modernizing Indian Navy potentially dominates the Indian Ocean. In fact, a focus of this work is the exemplary description of all the region's navies, with the author noting the naval arms race that is underway, particularly in the area of submarine acquisition. Cole is careful to couch this phenomenon in the regional concerns about Chinese naval expansion and the desire to ensure a continued, massive U.S. naval presence. The current naval developments in the region evince elements of a naval arms race, but lack the coherent maritime strategies to make naval developments dangerous to regional peace and security. Most telling will be whether United States power and focus remain on the region, while adjusting to continued Chinese maritime power in a way acceptable to both nations. No other current or recent work provides such a complete description of the Indo-Pacific region's navies and maritime strategies, while analyzing the current and future impact of those forces.

Fighting the Fleet recognizes that fleets conduct four distinct but interlocking tasks at the operational level of war-striking, screening, scouting, and basing-and that successful operational art is achieved when they are brought to bear in a cohesive, competitive scheme. In explaining these elements and how they are conjoined for advantage, a central theme emerges: despite the utility and importance of jointness among the armed forces, the effective employment of naval power requires a specialized language and understanding of naval concepts that is often diluted or completely lost when too much jointness is introduced. Woven into the fabric of the book are the fundamental principles of three of the most important naval theorists of the twentieth century: Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske, Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, and Captain Wayne Hughes. While Cares and Cowden advocate the reinvigoration of combat theory and the appropriate use of operations research, they avoid over-theorizing and have produced a practical guide that empowers fleet planners to wield naval power appropriately and effectively in meeting today's operational and tactical challenges.

Historically, operations and studies regarding maritime security focus on individual threats (e.g., piracy, terrorism, narcotics, etc.) and individual measures to target them (e.g., counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics). This book explores, for the first time, an overall strategy for maritime security, integrating these issues into a single framework. Tallis argues that as maritime security threats rise in sophistication, it will be increasingly appealing to apply military resources to counter them. Military tactics, however, may not be the ideal mechanisms for addressing challenges that are often closer to crime than they are to war. Leveraging the sea services' capabilities, without overly militarizing maritime security, is a complicated problem set that requires a more strategic and partner-oriented approach to the challenge. At stake, in Tallis' estimation, is the war for tomorrow's most important communities, their human security, and the muddy waters on which they and the global system rely.

On July 31, the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Maddox (DD-731) began a reconnaissance cruise off the coast of North Vietnam. On August 2, three North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the ship. On the night of August 4, the Maddox and another destroyer, the USS Turner Joy (DD-951), expecting to be attacked, saw what they interpreted as hostile torpedo boats on their radars and reported themselves under attack. The following day, the United States bombed North Vietnam in retaliation. Congress promptly passed, almost unanimously and with little debate, a resolution granting President Lyndon Johnson authority to take "all necessary measures" to deal with aggression in Vietnam. The incident of August 4, 1964, is at the heart of this book. The author interviewed numerous Americans who were present. Most believed in the moment that an attack was occurring. By the time they were interviewed, there were more doubters than believers, but the ones who still believed were more confident in their opinions. Factoring in degree of assurance, one could say that the witnesses were split right down the middle on this fundamental question. A careful and rigorous examination of the other forms of evidence, including intercepted North Vietnamese naval communications, interrogations of North Vietnamese torpedo boat personnel captured later in the war, and the destroyers' detailed records of the location and duration of radar contacts, lead the author to conclude that no attack occurred that night.

This book recognizes that everyone wants their Marine to be safe, secure and successful. From recruitment through transition back into civilian life, many will want this book nearby every step of the way.

The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is naval history's most powerful and versatile warship. It is the reason the U.S. Navy is the predominant force at sea today. Throughout its illustrious history, the carrier has overcome serious flaws, including its expense, vulnerability, centralization of combat power, and its airwing's short range. The U.S. Navy always accepted those flaws because the carrier was the best means of delivering firepower. Today's technologies, however, provide key opportunities for the U.S. Navy to move beyond the limitations of a carrier-centric fleet by redesigning its force structure.Questioning the Carrier examines how the U.S. Navy can embrace the Age of the Missile, network the distributed fleet, and diversify to develop a fleet that benefits from the aircraft carrier's many strengths without being wholly dependent on them. By acting on those opportunities, the U.S. Navy can develop a structure that performs the carrier-centric fleet's functions more effectively using a force consisting of more platforms with less total risk and within the same long-term budget. As adversaries are improving their ability to deter the carrier thus causing its utility to wane, the author examines the Navy's past successes to show how it can overcome institutional resistance to change and continue to rule the seas.

Admittedly small and vulnerable, PT boats were, nevertheless, fast-the fastest craft on the water during World War II-and Dick Keresey's account of these tough little fighters throws new light on their contributions to the war effort. As captain of PT 105, the author was in the same battle as John F. Kennedy when Kennedy's PT 109 was rammed and sunk. The famous incident, Keresey says, has often been described inaccurately and the PT boat depicted as unreliable and ineffective. This book helps set the record straight by presenting an authentic picture of PT boats that draws on the author's experience at Guadalcanal, New Georgia, Bougainville, and Choiseul Island. Action-filled, his account describes evading night bombers, rescuing coast watchers and downed airmen, setting down Marine scouts behind Japanese lines, engaging in vicious gun battles with Japanese barges and small freighters, and contending with heat, disease, and loneliness. First published in 1996, the book has been hailed for telling an exciting yet fully accurate story.

A masterpiece of World War II heroism, this book catches the spirit and tone of an incredible fighting ship, the USS Aaron Ward, a destroyer-turned-minelayer on the radar picket lines in the Pacific.

From the author of the acclaimed biography of Harry Hopkins comes this first full-scale portrait of Franklin D. Roosevelt's top military advisor, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy.

"A Pitiful, Unholy Mess is a detailed combat narrative of the 7 December 1941 Japanese attacks on O'ahu's Wheeler, Bellows, and Haleiwa Fields. The work focuses on descriptions of actions in the air and on the ground at the deepest practical tactical level, from both the U.S. and Japanese perspectives. The interwoven nature of the narratives of both sides provides a deep understanding of the events that has been impossible to present heretofore"--

"Cats were seen as omens in ancient times but eventually became trusted animal companions to those who sailed the seas. From catching rats at docks and on ships at sea, cats often became mascots to the navies around the globe. Filled with informative text and more than eighty photos, Cats in the Navy provides a fun history of our feline friends who rode the waves with us"--

On a mission over central Afghanistan, Punk is hit - and taken captive by the Taliban. And after he escapes, the challenge is not over. Because now Punk must navigate the war-torn country not from the skies, but on the ground - seeing up close for the first time the world of resistance fighters, warlords, CIA undercover ops, and corrupt officers.

"'I had no qualms fighting the Australians, just as I have killed without remorse any of the Emperor's enemies: the British, the Americans and the Dutch', so admits Takahiro Sato in this ground-breaking oral history of Japan's Pacific War. Thanks to years of research and over 100 interviews with veterans, the Author has compiled a fascinating collection of personal accounts by former Japanese soldiers, sailors and airmen."--

In the waning years of World War II, as the tragic plight of the Jews was coming to light in ever more horrific detail, a Jewish fighting force, known as the Jewish Infantry Brigade Group, was born as part of the British Eighth Army. Leslie Toliver eagerly joined for a chance to fight with his people against those who sought to murder them.

Sometimes it takes years for a combat vet to understand what his war did to him when he was nineteen. And even longer to explain the cadence he has marched to since then to the people he loves. Family and friends know Marty McClure as a kind, peaceful man. They aren't aware that when he was young, he plumbed the depths of terror, hatred and despair with no assurance he'd ever surface again. Now he needs to reveal what happened in Vietnam and how, with the help of Patti, his wife, Corrie Corrigan, a disabled vet, and Doc Matheson, a corpsman turned trauma surgeon, he made peace with the ghosts that have visited his dreams all these years. With the perception and reflection of a man on the cusp of retirement from a career teaching high school kids, Marty recalls the relentless intensity of prolonged combat as a teenage Marine machine gunner facing booby traps and battles in a war with few boundaries. Arriving in Vietnam, he is appalled by the savagery of his fellow Marines as they hunt an enemy indistinguishable from the villagers he believes they are there to protect. But as friends are crippled or killed over the ensuing months, Marty has to fight not only the enemy but the vicious darkness growing in him. Wounded and sent back to the U.S., he struggles to make sense of all he has lost in a war his country abandoned. He works to become a good husband, father and teacher while he fights to bury the war and rails against friends' enthusiasm for the Memorial and the Welcome Home for Vietnam Veterans planned in D.C. Only if he accepts help from his wife and his friends will he find real peace.

Some cultures are clearly more deceptive than others but only during any given slice of time. No single culture has excelled in deceptiveness throughout its history. While the Chinese did rise to the highest level of military deviousness during the time of Sun Tzu (c.350 BC), they had low levels before Master Sun, and afterwards largely lost it during three long periods, only to regain it each time. The most recent Chinese loss was when they fell to the lowest level from the late 1700s until being conquered in 1948 by the stratagemic Chinese Communists (PLA). Thence the PLA has displayed high if not the highest levels of deceptiveness, although there are indications that, beginning in 2002, they are again on the upswing.The levels of guilefulness at any given time can be quite different across the major disciplines of military, domestic politics, foreign diplomacy, and commercial business. Perceived practical considerations of greed and survival do sometimes override religious, moral, or ethical factors to produce deceptive behavior.The levels of guilefulness at any given point in time between any two contemporary armed entities (nations, insurgents, or terrorists) are apt to be asymmetric.Deception sophistication is independent of technological change. Within each culture deception varies widely in its levels of sophistication. High, medium, and low levels were found in every culture at different times and regardless of its level of technology. The reason? Because deception is a mind game, it is played only between or among humans. And this condition will remain as long as machines such as computers lack artificial intelligence.Because deception is a mind game, the variations in guilefulness between opposing individuals or groups can be crucial in deciding the victor in combat.

From the bloody battle for Normandy to the Nazi heartland, from war's end to the killing fields of Korea, the men of the British Army's Royal Tank Regiment fight battle after battle against terrible odds. Whether outnumbered or outgunned, the Tankies soldier on - as their motto would have it, "From Mud, Through Blood, to the Green Fields Beyond".

The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organisations better at this contest than others.

Challenging centuries-old conventional wisdom regarding the principles of war, tactics, and the roles of strategy, doctrine, experiential learning, and military history, Friedman's work offers a striking synthesis of thinking on tactics as well as strategy.

Chronicles the planning and conduct of Operation Inherent Resolve by US Central Command (CENTCOM) from August 2014 to mid-2018, with a principal focus on the contributions of US Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT).