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In every American conflict since World War II, the U.S. Air Force has found itself at odds with the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps over the employment of aviation assets. During the 1980.s this confrontation focused on joint doctrine that established a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). The JFACC has continued to be a source of friction and debate between the services.1 Even though this is still true, I believe that the Marine Corps and Air Force are making progress in the joint environment even though there are fundamental differences that may always remain due to separate service doctrine, missions, and traditional philosophies and beliefs. The intent of this paper is to discuss these differences and progress and perhaps dispel some common myths.
Disruptions in the supply of natural gas from Russia to Europe are one important factor highlighting the tensions between Russia and Europe. This paper analyzes the issues surrounding the main natural gas pipelines going into Europe. An examination of these issues helps to identify how Europe can have a more stable supply of natural gas while improving the relationship with Russia.
There are historical patterns to strategies for the conduct of war that are only fully understandable by seeking a close understanding of the human thread that runs through all war. This is counter to fashion, counter to the tendency to apply technology as an elixir against the trials of war. Although often neglected in the harrying bustle of the professional demands of a national security career, an enduring approach to the study of strategy and war should always include close readings and written responses to the educational habits of mind of foundational strategic thinkers as exemplified by the monoliths of military theory: Sun Tzu, Thucydides, and Clausewitz. Backing a broad professional discourse with these fundamentals must be a self-initiated approach to history and literature that can, over time, provide unique windows into Thucydides' vivid observation as to the human sources of war: fear, honor, and interest. In combination, these complementary, professionally structured and self-directed educational stratagems can serve officers on planning staffs and those in command as they advise civilian authorities in the executive and legislative branches and as they face down challenges, remain adaptive, and effectuate national military strategy despite the fog and friction of combat.
Abonner på vårt nyhetsbrev og få rabatter og inspirasjon til din neste leseopplevelse.
Ved å abonnere godtar du vår personvernerklæring.