Bøker av Rosemary Foot

This book examines the effects of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of 11 September 2001 on America's human rights and counter-terrorism policies towards a number of countries in Asia. Five countries have been chosen for examination, divided into two front-lines states (Pakistan and Uzbekistan), two second-front countries (Indonesia and Malaysia), and a third-front country, China. The paper also looks at changes in US domestic legislation and its treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere in order to analyse the extent to which the US promotion of an external human rights policy might also have been compromised by its own legislative changes as a result of the struggle against terrorism. The paper concludes that the attacks on US territory, overall, have constrained America's willingness and capacity to promote an external human rights policy with respect to these five countries. However, some attention - especially at the rhetorical level - to these countries' human rights records has been retained to differing degrees among the five states. This degree of difference is not explained entirely in reference to a country's perceived centrality to the struggle against terrorism. It depends on the extent to which the US executive and legislative branches are united - either singly or in combination - in their disapproval of a state's record, or in their understanding about how best to reach the policy goals that are sought.

In 1951, General Omar Bradley declared publicly that war with China would involve the United States "in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy." Despite the stated intent of the U.S. to keep the Korean conflict from spreading, the debate on extending the war was far more intense and protracted than previous accounts of this period have suggested.Concentrating on the debate over expansion, Rosemary Foot reveals the strains it caused both within the U.S. bureaucracy and between America and its North Atlantic allies. She supplies important new information on the U.S. government's appraisal of Sino-Soviet relations between 1950 and 1953, and makes clear that a high proportion of U.S. officials came to recognize the limited nature of Soviet support for China. Explaining why the Eisenhower administration nearly unleashed nuclear weapons on China in the spring of 1953, Foot demonstrates that the Korean war would very likely have grown into a conflict of major proportions if the Chinese and North Koreans had not conceded the final issue of the truce talks¿the question of the voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war.

After more than two years of bitter negotiations during which combatants & civilians continued to suffer casualties, the Korean armistice was concluded in July 1953. Focusing on the Americans formulation of negotiating positions & on their attempts to coordinate political goals with military tactics, Rosemary Foot here charts the tortuous path...