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Eleven years after Reinhard Gehlen, the head of Adolf Hitler's Eastern Front military intelligence unit, emerged from hiding to hand himself over to US forces, he had, with the help of the American CIA, created a legend for himself as founder and first president of the West German Secret Service. In this role he employed many of the same Wehrmacht and SS officers he had served with during the Second World War. All through the steady progression of his career before and during the Second World War, Gehlen had been far too industrious and committed to court the limelight. Then after the defeat of Germany, when he transferred his allegiance to the CIA and later became head of the Bundesnachrichtendienst, he became a man whom Hugh Trevor Roper's described as someone who 'always moved in the shadows'. For some, the German intelligence network that Gehlen had controlled since 1942, was part of an unbroken tradition going back to the days of Bismarck. For a great many in Gehlen's organisation the Cold War was merely an extension of an anti-Soviet campaign that had begun on 22 June 1941, when Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa. After the war, Gehlen had emerged unscathed from Hitler's bunker and no war crimes charges were ever brought against him. His name, and those of 350 of his Wehrmacht command, were redacted from the official lists of German prisoners of war. Gehlen protected and employed men like Heinrich Schmitz who had been part of Einsatzgruppe A, the murder squad that massacred so many, including communist functionaries and Jewish women, men and children, in the Baltic States. Though Gehlen had remained loyal to Hitler right to the end, once state authority collapsed he wasted little time in making contact with the Americans and offered to place his vast intelligence resources at their disposal in the new fight against Soviet communism. While German generals Heinz Guderian and Franz Halder placed great store by Gehlen's reports on the tactical level, Hitler called them 'defeatist' and gave them barely a glance when making his disastrous strategic decisions. Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, did not repeat Hitler's mistake, but Gehlen deeply resented the way that his reports to Dulles were mishandled. It became Gehlen's ambition initially to head up a completely independent West German foreign intelligence service. However, it was not until 1951 that talks to establish a West German intelligence service at federal level began. In the immediate post-war years, Gehlen tirelessly made his case to defend the harbouring of former Wehrmacht and SS personnel in his organisation and battled to prove his worth to the Americans. This book looks at Gehlen's life from his early career in the chaos of Weimar, through his elevation to General Staff intelligence officer on the Russian Front. It describes how he survived the defeat of the Third Reich and offered himself to the Americans as a foil against the Soviet Union in the Cold War. In doing so it closely examines Gehlen's record to separate fact from his self-serving fictions.
When Hitler was striving for recognition and relevance in the political turmoil of the early Weimar years in Germany he gave little thought to the world on the other side of the Atlantic other than to nurture a constant nagging resentment over President Wilson's role in the post-war evisceration of Germany at Versailles in 1919. It was the United States, however, that had bankrolled the German economy to substantially boost industrial production and employment in the 1920s and the evidence of American wealth and economic power was hard to ignore.Even when the Nazis took over in Germany after the elections of March 1933, Hitler's narrow vision was still concentrated on consolidating his power base in Germany itself and quickly thereafter expanded to take in the countries of Eastern Europe. What impressions he had of American culture and society were encapsulated in the trivialities and stereotypes of Hollywood movies depicting the 'wild west' or the deprivations of the Great Depression.Despite its economic power, nothing in Hitler's world view envisaged the United States as a potential player in European politics, but the Germans intelligence services that he inherited were not so easily convinced. They had been aware of American power and influence since before the First World War and for them, spying on the United States was nothing more than a continuation of their efforts to prevent that country thwarting German ambitions.There had been spectacular successes in the past, such as the espionage attack that had wreaked massive destruction in the Black Tom Island explosion on 30 July 1916. But overall, the German agencies had gone to great lengths and considerable expense without achieving their ambitions and failed to prevent American participation in the war. With another war in prospect, the Germans once again made plans to influence American policy and do what they could to keep their forces out of European affairs.Spying for Hitler traces the history of German espionage in the United States and describes, in detail, the personnel involved and operations they conducted all through the 1930s and early 1940s. It examines the training of German agents and the espionage techniques they employed.The way in which the FBI reacted to the threat, in particular, from the Griebl-Lonkowski spy ring, shows how Hoover's 'Feds' were initially slow to appreciate the danger, but soon learned the lessons. This was later to put them on a sounder footing to counter further attempts to infiltrate agents into the United States. This was most spectacularly displayed in Operation Pastorius, when saboteurs were landed on the American East Coast from U-boats.This book also examines the way in which the Germans used 'sleeper' agents and also describes how the FBI successfully 'turned' German agents to feed disinformation to Abwehr headquarters in Berlin. It describes how espionage missions played out and the fate of those involves.
In many countries around the world, the end of the First World War, far from leading to a new world order of stability, ushered in an era of uncertainty and economic decline. To solve the problems of unemployment, high inflation, low wages and poor working conditions, many turned to the political right for a solution - to leaders such as Mussolini and Hitler. But it was not only in countries such as Italy and Germany that people saw fascism as an alternative to democracy.It is sometimes said fascism in America first manifested itself as a reaction by a native-born population to the surge in the numbers of European immigrants in 1830. It went on to find a voice at least another four times up to the outbreak of the Second World War, most obviously in the formation of the German American Bund.American politicians and commentators have traditionally avoided applying the label of 'fascist' to any movement, preferring instead to describe extreme right-wing groups as 'nativist', money-making rackets exploiting gullible followers, or simply the 'lunatic fringe'. For many years this denied them the opportunity to examine the possibility that American fascist ideologies or social structures were rooted in patterns of the American past, as opposed to being a foreign import.The Ku Klux Klan has been described as the world's first fascist organization and this book looks at the arguments for and against that assertion. It also examines how the philosophy behind that movement remained as a potent undercurrent in American politics up to the start of the Second World War. There is also an examination of how American racial policies were used by the Nazis when drawing up their own.while argument persists over whether movements such as the Silver Shirts and the Friends of New Germany were truly fascist, it is undoubtedly the case that personalities behind them, individuals such as William Dudley Pelley and Father Charles Coughlin, exhibited all the classic characteristics of fascism. And they were by no means unpopular. A proponent of many of Hitler's policies, during the 1930s, when the US population was about 120 million, an estimated 30 million listeners, for example, tuned in to Coughlin's weekly radio program.This book compares the ways that both the United States and fascist regimes, especially that in Germany, tackled the immense social and economic problems resulting from the Great Depression. It also explores the way that European fascist regimes, especially that in Nazi Germany, tried to influence the American political process both legally and illegally and analyses the level of success they achieved in both.
During the Second World War, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were occupied on three separate occasions âEUR" twice by the Soviet Union and once by Nazi Germany. The signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 allowed the Soviets to dominate the Baltic states without fear of German reprisals, causing many in the German-Baltic populations to flee to Poland. Soviet rule of the Baltics was brutal with the purging of political elites and deportation of many tens of thousands in a bid to turn them into vassal states. Consequently, when Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, many Balts saw it as a liberation from Soviet cruelties. The reality was, however, that it turned out to be the beginning of something much worse. During their occupation of Poland prior to Barbarossa the Nazis had decimated the Polish political elites, and the Jews there had been herded into ghettos in preparation for deportation to the east where they would serve as slave labour in the Nazi economy after the conquest of the Soviet Union. Similar policies were to be adopted in the Baltics when Reinhard HeydrichâEUR(TM)s murder squads, the Einsatzgruppen, were allowed to move into the newly-occupied territories. Operating behind the advancing German forces Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, and D âEUR" four special mobile killing units, each made up of about a thousand men from the security police and the German intelligence service âEUR" proved to be more than willing to carry out HeydrichâEUR(TM)s orders. He had called for the removal of every vestige of opposition to Nazi rule which primarily meant complete elimination of the âEUR¿inferiorâEUR(TM) races who were unfit for work and the ghettoization of others in preparation for their economic exploitation. On foreign soil, away from scrutiny and free of all constraint, the Einsatzgruppen discovered that through the mass shootings of communists, Jews and gypsies it was possible to accelerate the pace of the Holocaust, slaughtering men, women and children in their tens of thousands. The Einsatzgruppen were assisted by local âEUR¿volunteersâEUR(TM) who helped to identify victims as well as kill them; in places whole Jewish communities were swiftly eliminated. Many of the killers and victims had known one another as neighbours and colleagues. This massive slaughter of civilians convinced Heydrich and Himmler that complete extermination of Jews was within their grasp and before very long, in the death camps, new industrial methods of killing would be devised.
When the Nazis came to power in January 1933, they began a programme of transforming Germany from a democracy into a totalitarian state, but it was not a matter of simply enforcing compliance. The people had to be coaxed into believing in the new regime. Hearts and minds had to be won over and one of the ways the Nazis did that was to create an ideal of German nationhood in which everyone could feel proud. This was especially the case with art, which came to be used as a powerful tool of propaganda both to disseminate the myth amongst the population and indicate to the Nazi administrators the sort of cultural environment they should create. It was not an easy thing to do. While the nation was being re-created as a dynamic, modern, and powerful industrial giant, all the signals coming from Hitler indicated that his own idyllic view of the German nation was of a traditional, rural people deep-rooted in a romantic-mystical aesthetic. Hitlerâ¿s own experience as an artist in Vienna before the First World War had shown that, whilst technically proficient, his work was detached and impersonal. Despite being rejected by the Vienna Academy of Fine Arts he continued to see himself as artistically gifted, especially in the field of architecture. This book looks at how the artistic side of Hitlerâ¿s personality dominated Nazi aesthetics and the ways in which the Third Reich manipulated public opinion and advanced its political agenda using the power of art. Despite his early setbacks, Hitler always thought of himself first and foremost an artist. He would frequently break off discussions with diplomats and soldiers to veer off on a lecture about his ideas on art and architecture which had been formed during his time in Vienna. _Nazi Propaganda Through Art and Architecture_ explores how Hitlerâ¿s artistic and architectural vision for Germany led to the monumental structures which we now associate with the Third Reich, alongside the rural idyl he sought to espouse, and how they came to symbolise the re-emergent power of a German nation which would dominate Europe.
Following the end of the First World War, the newly reformed state of Poland was wedged uncomfortably between the two dominant nations of Germany and the Soviet Union. With their diametrically opposed political philosophies, both of Poland's neighbors plotted continuously to reclaim its lands that had up until recently been part of the once great but now defunct German and Russian empires. In order to protect itself, Poland was obliged to plot and negotiate with both of its neighbors to try and prevent them from realizing their ambitions to eviscerate the country.The United States had been instrumental in the creation of the Polish state after the First World War, Wilson in particular stoking the Poles' growing powerful nationalistic fervor. As Norman Ridley reveals, this was the beginning of a turbulent period for Poland. There was, for example, the dramatic and improbable 'Miracle on the Vistula' when Polish forces defeated the communist Red Army in 1920 - and in so doing halted the spread of communism across eastern Europe. As well as bitter ethnic battles between Germany and Poland for the political control of Upper Silesia, there were also the burning ambitions of Weimar Germany, and later Nazi Germany, to reclaim lands stripped from them and incorporated into the new state of Poland at Versailles.Despite America's initial support after the war, the US thereafter showed little interest in Poland's predicament. While France was a traditional friend to the Polish peoples, and a significant supplier of military aid, its political influence over eastern European affairs weakened as its own political institutions fell prey to extremes of both left and right and its immediate post-war dominance waned. Britain was interested only in commerce and that made Germany and Russia significantly more important as trading partners than the predominantly agricultural and technically backward state of Poland.Despite the dominance of right-wing politics in Poland, the emergence of Hitler and the Nazis in Germany did little to bring the countries together. This even drove them further apart as the Führer ramped up his rhetorical assault on the perceived injustices of Versailles, which were soon to translate into territorial expansion over Austria and Czechoslovakia. Poland was to be the next in line.Britain and France belatedly roused themselves to challenge the threat posed by Hitler and the Nazis. After the capitulation of the Anschluss and the humiliation of Munich, London and Paris found themselves in the disagreeable position of seeing no option but to throw their whole weight behind the integrity of the Polish state if they were ever going to make any sort of stand against Nazi aggression.
The whereabouts and disposal of the Nazi's remaining stolen gold has led to numerous investigations and countless conspiracy theories. Norman Ridley uncovers many of the mysteries surrounding this continuing search for the missing millions.War is a costly business and in 1939, Germany was almost broke with its economy overheating and heading for runaway inflation. Hitler needed hard foreign currency to pay for his war machine and the only way he could get this was by selling gold that he looted from the national banks of Austria, Czechoslovakia and all the countries that were occupied after September 1939.Another source of gold was the theft of personal gold especially from the Jews, most grotesquely, the haul of dental gold which came out of the concentration camps.No neutral country would accept Reichsmarks so the gold had to be laundered through Swiss banks. The story of Swiss complicity in German war crimes is still a subject of controversy, and lawsuits. There are also questions about the parts played by other countries, particularly Portugal, in laundering stolen gold for the Nazis. The Vatican's dealings with Hitler have often been seen as ambiguous and this book investigates the Holy See's role in helping ship Nazi gold to South America, and how that gold might have been used to re-create the German Reich.After the war a commission was set up to recover as much gold as possible and restore it to those from whom it was stolen. This, of course, was beset by huge problems especially with regards to gold that was looted from Holocaust victims. Enormous quantities of gold and other treasures were hidden in a mine at Merkers in Thuringia which was found by the US 3rd Army in 1945, but much gold remains unaccounted for, and attempts are still ongoing to uncover supposed hidden caches, the most recent in Poland where four tons are believed to have been found by the Silesian Bridge Foundation in May of 2022.The whereabouts and disposal of the remaining stolen gold has led to numerous investigations and countless conspiracy theories. In Hitler's Gold the author analyzes these and uncovers many of the mysteries surrounding this continuing search for the missing millions.
The full story of the various warring nations' race to be the first to develop the atomic bomb.
This book looks at how these two 'strange bedfellows' dealt with western hostility and found ways to accommodate each other in a bid to recover from the economic devastation and dismantling of their historic territorial boundaries.
This book examines the way in which these air arms competed for prominence within the military structures of six major European nations - Germany, Britain, France, Soviet Union, Poland and Italy - with different resources, ambitions and philosophies, in the years from the beginning of aviation right up to the start of the Second World War.
When small-time petty crook and German agent provocateur Franz Fischer persuaded British SIS operatives in the Netherlands that he could act as a go-between with disaffected German generals, German spymaster Reinhard Heydrich got wind of it and decided to exploit the situation.
In this book, Norman Ridley reveals the remarkable efforts made by the tiny, underfunded and often side-lined British intelligence services as they sought to inform those whose role it was to make decisions upon which the wheels of history turned.
Explains the background to the conflict in Spain and the international reaction to the outbreak of the fighting.
The author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain.
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