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This conference investigates war termination, one of the most important issues facing military and political leaders as they use or contemplate the use of use of military force in the pursuit of national aims. Prompted by the Unified Quest Training and Leader Development theme and discussions about the use of history in training and leader development, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command and the United States Military Academy partnered on this war termination project and invited renowned military historians to provide their views on the subject. The study began with several seminars following Unified Quest in May of 2009. Each contributor provided a brief essay and presented their views on the topic at a War Termination Conference at West Point in June of 2010. These scholars represented a broad range of the American experience from the Revolutionary War to the first Gulf War. The assembled essays and interviews reflect the thoughts of these historians about America's wars, their concluding battles or final campaigns, and ultimately how they ended. While they provide no answers and no formula for successful war termination, they do provide thoughtful reflections from years of study and they suggest important implications for civilian and military decisionmakers today.

Originally published by the Combat Studies Institute in 2004 this study raises a variety of teaching points that are relevant to today's officer. In addition, the expedition exemplifies the values that have guided the American soldier to the present day. The Staff Ride Handbook for the Lewis and Clark Expedition provides a systematic approach to the analysis of this key operation. Part I consists of an expedition overview that establishes the context for the individual actions to be studied in the field. Part II surveys the Army during the early 19th century, detailing the organization, weapons, transportation, logistic support and medical support for the Corps of Discovery. Part III consists of a suggested itinerary of sites to visit to obtain a concrete view of the expedition in its several phases. For each site, or "stand," there is a set of travel directions, a discussion of the action that occurred there, and vignettes by participants in the expedition that further explain the action and which also allow the student to sense the human drama of the journey into the unknown. Parts IV and V provide information on conducting a staff ride along the Lewis and Clark route, the integration phase, and logistics considerations. Appendix A provides biographical sketches of key expedition members. Appendix B provides a copy of the 'Detachment Orders' written by the officers and NCOs of the corps. Appendix C overviews the uniforms worn by the expedition members, and Appendix D provides copies of the visuals used at the instructional stands. An annotated bibliography suggests sources for further study.

President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon made an urgent plea on 14 July 1958 to the governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States to deploy military forces to Lebanon. Received in Washington at 0600 on 14 July, this message became the first test of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which had been announced in January 1957. The JCS activated a Specified Command, Middle East (SPECOMME), and designated Adm. James L. Holloway, Commander in Chief, North Atlantic and Mediterranean, as the Commander in Chief, SPECOMME (CINCSPECOMME). According to a JCS memorandum, These actions marked the beginning of operation 'Blue Bat,' the first United States airborne-amphibious operation to occur in peacetime. Contents: Doctrine, Planning, Background, Problems, Deployment, Organization, Resupply, Procurement, Civil affairs, Medical support, Security, Plans, Task force 201, On-hand supplies, 31 August 1958. First published 1985.

First published in 2004, Major Donald Carr's "Into the Unknown: The Logistics Preparation of the Lewis and Clark Expedition" is a valuable study examining the key logistics components and considerations in the planning and execution of the mission. Modern logisticians will find themes in transportation, civilian contracting, indigenous (host nation) support, and others that still resonate today. Major Carr clearly demonstrates that Captains Lewis and Clark, in facing the daunting tasks of the great expedition, rose to the challenges and met them with ingenuity, detailed planning, discipline, leadership, and resolution-hallmarks worthy of reflection by today's junior leaders.

Originally published in 1989, this a volume from the Combat Studies Institute "Leavenworth Papers" series. In the fall of 1944, some 56,000 German troops of the XIX Mountain Corps were occupying a strongpoint line just 70 kilometers northwest of Murmansk, about 200 miles north of the Arctic Circle. To clear these enemy forces from Soviet territory, STA VKA ordered General K. A. Meretskov's Karelian Front to plan and conduct an offensive, which was to be supported by Admiral A. G. Golovko's Northern Fleet. This Leavenworth Paper explains the planning and conduct of this offensive, known in Soviet military historiography as the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation. The Soviet force of approximately 96,000 men was organized into a main attack force of two rifle corps, a corps- size economy-of-force formation, and two envelopment forces, one consisting of two naval infantry brigades and the other of two light rifle corps of two brigades each. The Soviets employed over 2,100 tubes of artillery and mortars, used 110 tanks and self-propelled guns, and enjoyed overwhelming air superiority. Engineer special-purpose troops infiltrated up to fifty kilometers behind German forward positions to conduct reconnaissance before the battle. On 7 October 1944, the Soviets began the offensive with a 97,000-round artillery preparation, followed by an infantry attack.

Originally published in 1982, this a volume in the Combat Studies Institute "Leavenworth Papers" series. Abstract: "Night combat has frequently been the recourse of the inferior military force or, as in World War II, of the army seeking either to find some respite from air power or to reduce casualties in the face of great firepower. Still, despite the difficulties associated with conducting military operations at night, military planners and leaders cannot escape one salient fact: darkness is a double-edged weapon. During World War II, the Soviets effectively exploited darkness in a variety of operations from withdrawal to pursuit. As the war dragged on, the Red Army relied increasingly on night operations and so refined its abilities that it was able to progress from limited tactical missions by relatively small units to front-level operations by armies with complex coordination and control. Today Soviet military writers frequently discuss night operations, as they do all operations, with reference to their experiences in the Second World War. They appear convinced, as one Soviet general and historian has noted, that their troops should be equally capable of operating both during the day and at night and that night operations have an urgent significance in modern warfare". Include photos. maps, tables.

Originally published in 1984, this a volume in the Combat Studies Institute "Leavenworth Papers" series. On the night of 10-11 July, several thousand Japanese infantrymen attack and broke through U.S. Army covering force units defending the Driniumor River about twenty miles east of Aitape, New Guinea. For the next month U.S. army troops were locked in a battle of attrition with the Japanese, as the Americans fought to restore the breakthrough line and destroy the Japanese attackers. This study describes the events leading up to the Japanese breakthrough and the subsequent American counterattack to restore the original defensive positions. Include photos. maps, tables.

First published in 1993. This study focuses on the conduct of the battle and the role of American combat advisers and United States air power played in defeating the North Vietnamese forces during the Spring of 1972.

Firs published in 1991. "Desert Warfare: German Experiences in World War II" is an abridgment of a two-volume work that first appeared in 1952. Organized by Major General Alfred Toppe and written with the assistance of nine German commanders who served in North Africa, the manuscript represents a collaborative attempt to determine as many factors as possible which exerted a determining influence on desert warfare. Issues addressed include planning, intelligence, logistics, and operations. Described and analyzed are the German order of battle, the major military engagements in North Africa, and the particular problems of terrain and climate in desert operations. Not unlike many of the U.S. units engaged in the war with Iraq, the Germans in North Africa learned about combat operations in the desert only after they arrived on the scene and confronted the desert on its own terms. For this reason alone, as well as for the insights it offers, Desert Warfare requires the serious consideration of those responsible for preparing the U.S. military for any future conflict in desert terrain.

First published in 1988. Over sixty years have passed since Allied armies landed in Normandy with the purpose of liberating western Europe and destroying Hitler's Third Reich. Despite this passage of time and extensive writings on the landings in France, officers and historians are still intensely interested in D-Day and the Normandy campaign. Indeed, a great deal remains to be learned about the U.S. Armys's participation in the Normandy campaign, and a detailed examination of the fighting yields a fruitful case study for America's professional officer corps concerning how American soldiers performed in combat, how squads and platoons closed with and destroyed the enemy, and how the Army adapted methods to overcome a whole host of problems that it encountered in combat. This study attempts to identify the problems that hampered the operations of the U.S. First Army during the weeks immediately following the D-Day landings. in Normandy, inexperienced American combat units struggled with veteran German defenders on terrain specially suited for the defense. The U.S. Army was faced with the problem of conducting offensive operations in the Normandy hedgerow country- known as the Bocage. Shortcomings in preinvasion training and preparation resulted initially in uncoordinated efforts whenever American infantry, tanks, and artillery tried to combine forces during attacks.

First published in 1986. An in-depth analysis of the Battle of Bastogne, focusing on the ability of a light division to defeat heavier ones, leads to predictable conclusions. At Bastogne, well-coordinated combined arms teams defeated uncoordinated German armored and infantry forces committed to an unrealistic plan. Results of isolated cases in which American infantry fought German armored forces point out how important the attached package of tanks and tank destroyers was to the 101st. The infantry, fighting alone, would have lost Bastogne early in the battle. Coordinated German attacks in mass, rather than the small unit attacks they employed, might also have resulted in a decisive German victory over the 101st and its attachments. In the final equation, moral strength, luck, and the 'fog of war' must also be considered. The Americans had advantages in all of these categories. The right combination of events and situations- conditions unfavorable to the Germans and favorable to the Americans-produced the American victory at Bastogne. At Bastogne, a light infantry division, properly augmented by good artillery and armor support, was able to defeat a numerically superior and heavier opponent. But the conditions of that victory were particular, not universal in application.

Contains the definitive history of the extensive but little known U.S. Army amphibious operations during the Korean War, 1950-1953. Provides insights to modern planners crafting future joint or combined operations in that part of the world. Originally published in 2008. Illustrated.

Originally published by the United States Army Combat Studies Institute Press in 2009, this monograph is a wide-ranging historical survey of the theory, doctrine, organization, and employment of reconnaissance units since the era of mechanization in the early 20th century. This study examines the development, role, and employment of units in modern armies designed specifically to perform reconnaissance and security (counterreconnaissance) missions. The analysis discerns common threads from the past. Conclusions are drawn from historical trends that may apply to future force development planning and unit operational employment. In the past, dedicated reconnaissance units were unique in their organization and capabilities due to the presence of the horse. This provided cavalry with a marked mobility differential over infantry and artillery. In the mechanized age, this monopoly on mobility vanished. Nonreconnaissance mechanized and motorized forces were equipped with similar weapons and vehicles. Reconnaissance units then became distinctive primarily by their organizational structure and specialized mission rather than by their equipment. This conceptual transformation has created a great dichotomy for modern reconnaissance forces. Should such forces be light or heavy? A lighter force might be able to conduct reconnaissance operations, at least theoretically, in a more nimble fashion, while a heavier force could defend itself when conducting reconnaissance and security operations. An additional consideration is the question as to what organizational level should dedicated reconnaissance forces be provided and used. This work examines these two major threads from a historical perspective since World War I.

This study investigates the Tippecanoe campaign and battle conducted in 1811 between the United States military forces under the command of General William Henry Harrison and an Indian confederacy based at Tippecanoe. The study identifies and describes important relationships and treaties between the United States and Indians in the American northwest during the late eighteenth - and early nineteenth - century. The study details the actions in Harrison's Tippecanoe campaign in the fall of 1811. United States and woodland Indian military doctrine, tactics, and organization that apply to Tippecanoe are described. The study also describes key battlefield activities of the Tippecanoe battle on 7 November 1811.