Bøker av Clint Reach

Russia's manipulation of Ukraine in the post-Soviet period, which culminated in a large-scale invasion in 2022, demonstrated that Russia was willing to resort to all means necessary to secure a regional sphere of influence that included Ukraine. But events could have turned out differently. Russia and Ukraine share historical, cultural, religious, and interpersonal ties. Russia in the early 1990s appeared to be on a path toward democratization and constructive relations with its neighbors and the rest of Europe. Many Ukrainians also saw their future as an independent country that was part of a greater Europe in some form. Given the alignment of national interests in the early days of the post-Cold War era, conflict appeared far from inevitable. How did things go so wrong? Using the concept of national identity as a starting point, RAND researchers developed a framework in an effort to illuminate the underlying causes of Russian manipulation, Ukrainian resistance, and the Russia-Ukraine war.

"RAND researchers examine the reasons behind Russia's evolution toward a unified strategic operation, as well as the capabilities that would be necessary to execute key conventional offensive tasks in such an operation"--

Russia has defined its national interests in terms of resisting the U.S.-backed European integration system, challenging or supplanting U.S. influence around the globe, and pursuing an "independent foreign policy" that could bring it into conflict with China at some point in the future. Under the conditions present at the time of this writing, a great power war with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most likely large-scale scenario for which the Russian military must prepare. How is it preparing? What is its strategy? The authors of this report identify and examine key factors to assess the orientation of Russia's military strategy. The factors the authors consider are the overall balance of power, Russian diplomacy with China, Russian views on the character of future war, and key trends in force readiness and mobilization. The authors also explore existing operational concepts to understand how Russia might execute that military strategy.

The Russian Ministry of Defense uses military forecasting to inform its long-term planning. Since the 1960s, Russian military analysis has applied comprehensive assessments of a country's ability to wage war that go beyond weapons and formations. The Ministry of Defense uses this forecasting to answer (1) what is the likelihood and character of future war and (2) what is the correlation of military potential between Russia and its potential adversaries? In this report, the authors draw on an established framework to examine key indicators related to military forecasting to gain insight into the answers to these questions. The Russian military science and academic research that the authors of this report reviewed found that the correlation of military potential (state power)-a broad measure that includes political, economic, scientific-technical, and conventional armed forces indicators-is and will be weighted in favor of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the West and the United States and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region through 2040. The factors that could improve Russia's competitive position are the inclusion of China in the correlation of military potential and the possible reduced ability of the United States to manage the international system in ways that favor its interests. Russia's current military assessments and forecasts have not found indications of intentions of the United States or China to launch a large-scale war against Russia. The conditions under which Russia might take preemptive military action that risks war with an opponent with superior military potential remain an open question.