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This book is a collection of essays on Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE), exploring the 'non-military' aspects of British 'special operations' over the course of the Second World War.

This volume investigates the connection between intelligence history, domestic policy, military history and foreign relations in a time of increasing bureaucratization of the modern state.

This work examines the ways in which the relationship between the military community and the intelligence profession has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.

New information obtained from the declassification of Ultra intercepts and other Second World War documents as well as from recent scholarly research has credited Allied deception operations with an even more important contribution to winning the war than was previously supposed. Yet deception is only one factor in the achievement of victory; it cannot guarantee success. It must be fully understood and exploited by the highest levels of command. Most histories of deception operations during the Second World War have focused on those that were successful. Instances in which deception operations failed to achieve their objectives are discussed by John Campbell, who describes an early attempt to convince the Germans that the Allies intended to invade at Pas de Calais in the summer of 1943, and by Katherine Herbig, who gives the first detailed description of US deception operations in the Pacific. Klaus-Jurgen Muller questions the actual effectiveness of deception operations against the Germans. He argues that many successes attributed to the Allies' use of deception were in fact achieved by independent considerations on the German side. Professor Muller builds a particularly strong case in challenging the success of Operation Fortitude North, in which the Allies tried to divert German troops to Norway before invading Normandy. Although very little is known of Soviet deception operations on the Eastern Front, it must be remembered that they were conducted on a much larger scale than those of either the British in Europe or the Americans in the Pacific. Colonel David Glantz's account of Soviet deception and covert activities offers a version of the historiography of the war between the USSRand Germany which may explain some of the monumental German failures. Tom Cubbage not only contributes a synthesis of the primary and secondary sources available on the deception operations preceding Overlord, but also reviews the so-called Hesketh Report - Fortitude: A History of Strategic Deception in North Western Europe April 1943 to May 1945, Colonel Roger Hesketh's official report on Allied deception operations against the Germans in north-west Europe which was declassified in 1976, yet remains unpublished. It indicates that Professor Muller's suspicions that the Allies over-estimated the impact of Fortitude are unfounded. Edited and with a comprehensive introduction by Michael Handel, these important and original studies put the entire deception effort during the Second World War into a more balanced and accurate perspective.

A collection of documents, this book aims to explore the different ways in which intelligence can be studied by bringing together both scholarly and practical expertise to examine a range of primary material relevant to the history of intelligence since the early twentieth century.

Highlights of the volume include pioneering essays on the methodology of intelligence studies by Michael Fry and Miles Hochstein, and the future perils of the surveillance state by James Der Derian.

This work illustrates some of the steps by which information from intercepted messages in the supposedly unbreakable German Enigma cipher was developed, while providing a candid glimpse of the workings of British intelligence.

Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis examines for the first time the role and performance of all three intelligence communities centrally involved in this seminal event: American, Soviet and Cuban.

The essays in this volume offer reinterpretations of some of the major established themes in CIA history - such as its origins, its foundations, its treatment of the Soviet threat, the Iranian revolution and the accountability of the agency.

The second edition of this account of aspects of World War II includes the revelation of what is called "the Ultra Secret"; the fact that the British were able to decipher German radio messages on the highest Command links.

This book provides a cross-section of case studies that highlight the connections between overt/covert activities and cultural/political agendas during the early Cold War.

The articles in this volume demonstrate that the codebreaking war was a truly global conflict in which many countries were active and successful.