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Contrary to the standard theory which views the origin of uncertainty as being exogenous to the economic system, the theory of rational beliefs holds that a crucial component of social risk and economic fluctuations is endogenously propagated by variations in the state of beliefs of market participants.

This is the first book combining research on the Global Environment, Catastrophic Risks and Economic Theory and Policy. This book brings together new approaches on multiple levels: environmental sustainability requires rethinking in terms of economic theory and policy as well as the considerations of catastrophic risk and extremal events.

He has made significant contributions on general equilibrium theory, monetary theory, learning, aggregation, non-linear dynamics and sunspots. This book assembles contributions by Jean-Michel Grandmont's colleagues, students and friends that have been influenced by his works and that are at the frontier of research in this domain today.

Experimental methods are now a mainstream empirical methodology in economics. The papers in this volume represent some recent developments in research on experimental markets. The articles span a variety of topics related to experimental markets, including auctions, taxation, institutional differences, coordination in markets, and learning.

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game.

The contributing authors are Daniel McFadden, Rosa Matzkin, Emma Moreno-Garcia, Roger Lagunoff, Yakar Kannai, Myrna Wooders, James Moore, Ted Bergstrom, Luca Anderlini, Lin Zhou, Mark Bagnoli, Alexander Kovalenkov, Carlos Herves-Beloso, Michaela Topuzu, Bernard Cornet, Andreu Mas-Colell and Nicholas Yannelis.

Other topics include determinacy in OLG with cash-in-advance constraints, income distribution and democracy in OLG, learning in OLG and in games, optimal pricing of derivative securities, the impact of heterogeneity at the individual level for aggregate consumption, and adaptive contracting in view of uncertainty.

A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.

An analysis of criminal behavior from the perspectives of rational choice theory leading to suggestions for a criminal policy. Previous edition sold 900 copies world wide since its release in June 2001.

Other topics include determinacy in OLG with cash-in-advance constraints, income distribution and democracy in OLG, learning in OLG and in games, optimal pricing of derivative securities, the impact of heterogeneity at the individual level for aggregate consumption, and adaptive contracting in view of uncertainty.

The subject matter also has a wide leeway, ranging from solution concepts for economies to those for games and also including representation of preferences and discussion of purely mathematical problems, all within the rubric of choice variables belonging to an infinite dimensional space, interpreted as a commodity space or as a strategy space.

Here, two highly experienced authors present an alternative approach to optimal stopping problems. The basic ideas and techniques of the approach can be explained much simpler than the standard methods in the literature on optimal stopping problems.

Assembles theoretical contributions to monetary theory, banking and finance. This book includes papers spanning themes from monetary policy to the optimal design of financial systems, and from the study of the causes of financial crises to payment systems design. It serves as a reference to researchers interested in the study of financial systems.

The contributing authors are Daniel McFadden, Rosa Matzkin, Emma Moreno-Garcia, Roger Lagunoff, Yakar Kannai, Myrna Wooders, James Moore, Ted Bergstrom, Luca Anderlini, Lin Zhou, Mark Bagnoli, Alexander Kovalenkov, Carlos Herves-Beloso, Michaela Topuzu, Bernard Cornet, Andreu Mas-Colell and Nicholas Yannelis.

Contrary to the standard theory which views the origin of uncertainty as being exogenous to the economic system, the theory of rational beliefs holds that a crucial component of social risk and economic fluctuations is endogenously propagated by variations in the state of beliefs of market participants.

Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 appeared in a Symposium on Chaotic Dynamical Systems in Economic Theory (Volume 4, Number 5, 1994). For a course on dynamic optimization addressed to students with a good background in economic theory and real analysis, one can assign Chapter 2 as a partial introduction to the basic tech niques.

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game.