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This volume provides a collection of insightful essays on all phases of the Iraq War: both US-led major combat operations to defeat the Ba'athist regime as well as efforts to reconstruct the country and defeat the insurgency.

This book explains why logistical planning is studied by military professionals and uses case studies to bring home its importance.

Provides a collection of essays on all phases of the Iraq War including both US-led major combat operations to defeat the Ba'athist regime as well as efforts to reconstruct the country and defeat the insurgency. This book is of interest to students of the Iraq War, small wars and insurgencies, international security and strategic studies.

Examines the evolution of the strategic basing systems of the great powers, covering an 800-year span of history, from the Mongol dynasty to the era of the US empire. This book details the progression of strategic basing systems and power projection, from its beginnings at a regional level to its global reach.

Examines US Army Special Forces efforts to mobilize and train indigenous minorities in Vietnam. Combining Clausewitz, business theory and strategic insight, this book aims to provide a starting point for thinking about how the US military should be approaching the problems of 'small wars'.

How do we plan under conditions of uncertainty? This volume contains chapters that are grouped into four periods: 1815-1856, 1871-1914, 1918-1938, and post-Second World War, that range from low-tech to high-tech concerns.

Much of today's Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) literature subscribes to the idea that the information age will witness a transformation in the very nature of war. In this book, David Lonsdale puts that notion to the test.

Carl von Clausewitz's thought played a part in the process of military reform and the transition in US policy that took place after the Vietnam War. This book demonstrates how Clausewitzian thought influenced American strategic thinking between the Vietnam War and the conflict in Iraq. It is useful for students of strategy and military history.

This volume identifies and evaluates the relationship between outer-space geography and geographic position (astrogeography), and the evolution of current and future military space strategy.

The perspective of military planners is a key organizing framework: Do they see themselves as preparing to administer a peace, or preparing to fight a future war? This volume contains chapters that are grouped into four periods: 1815-1856, 1871-1914, 1918-1938, and post-Second World War, that range from low-tech to high-tech concerns.

Shows how a number of different special operations, in conjunction with more conventional military actions, achieve and sustain strategic effect(s) over time. This book argues that the root of effective special operations lies in understanding the relationship existing between moral and material attrition at the strategic level.

Presents a selection of Professor Gray's contributions to strategic debate. This book covers a wide range of subjects and historical events, and issues covered on: being strategic; the consequences of actions; respect for Clausewitz's theory of war; historical dependency; the importance of geography; and the primacy of politics.

This book examines how the US Army rebuilt itself after the Vietnam War and how this has effected US intervention policy after the Cold War.

Offers a strategic analysis of one of the military careers in history, identifying the most pertinent strategic lessons from the campaigns of Alexander the Great.

Examines the challenge posed to the Allies by their disarmament of Germany after the Treaty of Versailles. This book focuses on the role of international arms inspectors working amidst an embittered German populace; the ramifications of the divergent disarmament priorities; and the effectiveness of united Allied policies backed by sanctions.

In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly historical practice of the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of how and why strategy "works".

Defence against ballistic missiles has been a subject of UK political policy and technical investigation since World War II - this book analyses that long history.

An illuminating insight into the work of Thomas Schelling, one of the most influential strategic thinkers of the nuclear age. By the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the United States' early forays into Vietnam, he had become one of the most distinctive voices in Western strategy. This book shows how Schelling's thinking is much more than a reaction to the tensions of the Cold War. In a demonstration that ideas can be just as significant as superpower politics, Robert Ayson traces the way this Harvard University professor built a unique intellectual framework using a mix of social-scientific reasoning, from economics to social theory and psychology. As such, this volume offers a rare glimpse into the intellectual history which underpins classical thinking on nuclear strategy and arms control - thinking which still has an enormous influence in the early twenty-first century.

Analyses the American way of war within the context of Clausewitzian theory. This book argues that the situation in which America has found itself in Iraq is the direct result of a culturally predisposed inclination to substitute technology for strategy.

This volume charts how the national strategic needs of the United States of America and Great Britain created a "parallel but not joint" relationship towards the Far East as the crisis in that region evolved from 1933-39.

Explains how the US military reacted to the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), and failed to innovate its organization or doctrine to match the technological breakthroughs it brought about. This book examines how each of the five US armed services made their adjustments both to the technologies and the use of force.

Examines the thirty-year transformation in American military thought and defence strategy that spanned from 1973 through 2003. This book tells the story of how innovative approaches to solving battlefield challenges gave rise to non-nuclear strategic strike, and the quest to apply information technology to offset Soviet military advantages.

This volume offers a dispassionate strategic examination of the Vietnam conflict that challenges the conventional wisdom that South Vietnam could not survive as an independent non-communist entity over the long term.

Presents a study of the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918 based extensively on key German records. This book demonstrates how the German failure to exploit the vulnerabilities in the BEF's rail system led to the failure of the first two offensives, and how inadequacies in the German rail system determined the outcome of the last three offensives.

Presents an analysis of the strategic theories of John Boyd, the leading US strategist. This study corrects the common misinterpretations of his work, showing how his thinking impacted on US military doctrine and defence policy.