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This volume aims to redress the neglect of role ethics by confronting the tensions between impartial morality and role obligations in analytic philosophy and the Confucian tradition.

This book's guiding motivation is that important discussions about the ultimate nature of morality can be found far beyond ancient Greece and modern Europe. The volume¿s aim is to show how these comparisons offer challenges and new perspectives to contemporary analytic metaethics.

This book features essays from leading scholars who, rather than taking a strictly exegetical approach, show how discussions in moral philosophy can benefit from Wittgenstein¿s later philosophical work.

This book sheds light on precisely how virtues and reasons are related to each other and what can be learned by exploring this relationship.

This book advances research by exploring and challenging different theoretical approaches to empathy. It includes essays that advocate for the centrality of perspective-taking in empathy, as well as others that advance alternative theories that rely on narrative engagement, attunement, and the "second-person" model of empathy.

This book explores the nitty-gritty details of particular virtues. Most of the virtues discussed?ambition, cheerfulness, creativity, magnificence, pride, wit, wonder?have been almost wholly neglected by contemporary ethicists.

This book presents and integrates new, interdisciplinary research into virtue, happiness, and the meaning of life by re-orienting these discussions around the concept of self-transcendence.

We are often pressed to forgive or in need of forgiveness: Wrongdoing is common. Even after a perpetrator has been taken to court and punished, forgiveness still has a role to play. How should a victim and a perpetrator relate to each other outside the courtroom, and how should others relate to them? Communicating about forgiveness is particularly urgent in cases of civil war and crimes against humanity inside a community where, if there were no forgiveness, the community would fall apart.Forgiveness is governed by social and, in particular, by moral norms. Do those who ask to be forgiven have to fulfil certain conditions for being granted forgiveness? And what does the granting of forgiveness consist in? We may feel like refusing to forgive those perpetrators who have committed the most horrendous crimes. But is such a refusal justified even if they repent their crimes? Could there be a duty for the victim to forgive? Can forgiveness be granted by a third party? Under which conditions may we forgive ourselves?The papers collected in this volume address all these questions, exploring the practice of forgiveness and its normative constraints. Topics include the ancient Chinese and the Christian traditions of forgiveness, the impact of forgiveness on the moral dignity and self-respect of the victim, self-forgiveness, the narrative of forgiveness, as well as the limits of forgiveness. Such limits may arise from the personal, historical, or political conditions of wrongdoing or from the emotional constraints of the victims.

Why save endangered species without clear aesthetic, economic, or ecosystemic value? This book takes on this challenging question through an account of the intrinsic goods of species.

This collection provides a focused and comprehensive discussion of the the moral demandingness objection, the principle "ought implies can," and the ways these two ideas relate to one another, while also taking a closer look at the consequences for the limits of moral normativity in general. Chapters engage with contemporary discussions surrounding "ought implies can" as well as current debates on moral demandingness, and argue that applying the moral demandingness objection to the entire range of normative ethical theories also calls for an analysis of its (metaethical) presuppositions.

The original essays in this volume present a timely response to the proliferation of mass and random violence that troubles contemporary society, making a case for the importance of moral sensitivity based on interdisciplinary work framed by traditional philosophical reasoning and informed by psychological research.

This book offers a new account of what it is to act for a normative reason and clarifies the relation between the normative reason that an agent acts for and his or her motivating reasons.

This volume aims to establish a new cultivation of the self strand within contemporary moral philosophy. It offers a fresh approach to the eudaimonic tradition: instead of conditions for rightness of actions, it focuses on conceptions of human life that are best for the one living it.

This book explores the associative duties we owe to our children, parents, friends, colleagues, associates and compatriots and defends a novel account which justifies such duties through the realization of values that are produced in these various kinds of social relationships.

Why save endangered species without clear aesthetic, economic, or ecosystemic value? This book takes on this challenging question through an account of the intrinsic goods of species.

This collection sheds light on precisely how virtues and reasons are related to each other and what can be learned by exploring this relationship. The first section analyzes how the virtues may be related to, or linked with, normative reasons in ways that improve our understanding of what constitutes virtuous character and ethical agency. The second section explores the reasons moral agents have for cultivating the virtues of character and how the virtues impact moral responsiveness or development. The final section examines how reasons can be employed in understanding the nature of virtue, and how specific virtues, like modesty and practical wisdom, interact with reasons.

Since ancient times, character, virtue, and happiness have been central to thinking about how to live well. Yet until recently, philosophers have thought about these topics in an empirical vacuum. Taking up the general challenge of situationism ΓÇô that philosophers should pay attention to empirical psychology ΓÇô this interdisciplinary volume presents new essays from empirically informed perspectives by philosophers and psychologists on western as well as eastern conceptions of character, virtue, and happiness, and related issues such as personality, emotion and cognition, attitudes and automaticity. Researchers at the top of their fields offer exciting work that expands the horizons of empirically informed research on topics central to virtue ethics.

This book brings together new essays that explore the connection between love and reasons. Love, Reason and Morality will be of interest to philosophers working on issues of normativity, meta-ethics and moral psychology, and especially those interested in the source of practical reasons and the role of emotions in practical deliberation.

This volume works to connect issues in environmental ethics with the best work in contemporary normative theory. Environmental issues challenge contemporary ethical theorists to account for topics that traditional ethical theories do not address to any significant extent. This book articulates and evaluates consequentialist responses to that challenge. Contributors provide a thorough and well-rounded analysis of the benefits and limitations of the consequentialist perspective in addressing environmental issues. In particular, the contributors use consequentialist theory to address central questions in environmental ethics, such as questions about what kinds of things have value; about decision-making in light of the long-term, intergenerational nature of environmental issues; and about the role that a stateΓÇÖs being natural should play in ethical deliberation.

The original essays in this volume present a timely response to the proliferation of mass and random violence that troubles contemporary society, making a case for the importance of moral sensitivity based on interdisciplinary work framed by traditional philosophical reasoning and informed by psychological research.

This collection provides a focused and comprehensive discussion of the the moral demandingness objection, the principle "ought implies can," and the ways these two ideas relate to one another, while also taking a closer look at the consequences for the limits of moral normativity in general. Chapters engage with contemporary discussions surrounding "ought implies can" as well as current debates on moral demandingness, and argue that applying the moral demandingness objection to the entire range of normative ethical theories also calls for an analysis of its (metaethical) presuppositions.

Taking up the general challenge of situationism ¿ that philosophers should pay attention to empirical psychology ¿ this interdisciplinary volume presents new essays from empirically informed perspectives by philosophers and psychologists on western as well as eastern conceptions of character, virtue, and happiness, and related issues such as personality, emotion and cognition, attitudes and automaticity.

This volume works to connect issues in environmental ethics with the best work in contemporary normative theory. In particular, the contributors use consequentialist theory to address central questions in environmental ethics, such as questions about what kinds of things have value; about decision-making in light of the long-term, intergenerational nature of environmental issues; and about the role that a state's being natural should play in ethical deliberation.

By bringing together influential critics of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics with some of the strongest defenders of an Aristotelian approach, this collection provides a fresh assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Aristotelian virtue ethics and its contemporary interpretations. Contributors critically discuss and re-assess the neo-Aristotelian paradigm which has been predominant in the philosophical discourse on virtue for the past 30 years.

We are often pressed to forgive or in need of forgiveness: Wrongdoing is common. Even after a perpetrator has been taken to court and punished, forgiveness still has a role to play. How should a victim and a perpetrator relate to each other outside the courtroom, and how should others relate to them? Communicating about forgiveness is particularly urgent in cases of civil war and crimes against humanity inside a community where, if there were no forgiveness, the community would fall apart.Forgiveness is governed by social and, in particular, by moral norms. Do those who ask to be forgiven have to fulfil certain conditions for being granted forgiveness? And what does the granting of forgiveness consist in? We may feel like refusing to forgive those perpetrators who have committed the most horrendous crimes. But is such a refusal justified even if they repent their crimes? Could there be a duty for the victim to forgive? Can forgiveness be granted by a third party? Under which conditions may we forgive ourselves?The papers collected in this volume address all these questions, exploring the practice of forgiveness and its normative constraints. Topics include the ancient Chinese and the Christian traditions of forgiveness, the impact of forgiveness on the moral dignity and self-respect of the victim, self-forgiveness, the narrative of forgiveness, as well as the limits of forgiveness. Such limits may arise from the personal, historical, or political conditions of wrongdoing or from the emotional constraints of the victims.