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This collection of original essays explores the topic of skeptical invariantism in theory of knowledge. It provides a carefully structured, state-of-the-art overview of skeptical invariantism and offers up new questions and avenues for future research.

This is the first volume dedicated solely to the topic of epistemological disjunctivism. It addresses the historical background of epistemological disjunctivism, tackles a number contemporary issues related to epistemological disjunctivism, and extends the framework of epistemological disjunctivism to other forms of knowledge.

This volume provides a framework for approaching and understanding mental normativity. It presents cutting-edge research on the ethics of belief as well as innovative research beyond the normativity of belief-and towards an ethics of mind. By moving beyond traditional issues of epistemology the contributors discuss the most current ideas revolving around rationality, responsibility, and normativity.The book's chapters are divided into two main parts. Part I discusses contemporary issues surrounding the normativity of belief. The essays here cover topics such as control over belief and its implication for the ethics of belief, the role of the epistemic community for the possibility of epistemic normativity, responsibility for believing, doxastic partiality in friendship, the structure and content of epistemic norms, and the norms for suspension of judgment. In Part II the focus shifts from the practical dimensions of belief to the normativity and rationality of other mental states-especially blame, passing thoughts, fantasies, decisions, and emotions. These essays illustrate how we might approach an ethics of mind by focusing not only on belief, but also more generally on debates about responsibility and rationality, as well as on normative questions concerning other mental states or attitudes.The Ethics of Belief and Beyond paves the way towards an ethics of mind by building on and contributing to recent philosophical discussions in the ethics of belief and the normativity of other mental phenomena. It will be of interest to upper-level students and researchers working in epistemology, ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, and moral psychology.

This book collects original essays on the epistemology of modality and related issues in modal metaphysics and philosophical methodology.

This book uses the framework of care ethics to articulate a novel theory of our epistemic obligations to one another. It presents an original way to understand our epistemic vulnerabilities, our obligations in education, and our care-duties toward others with whom we stand in epistemically vulnerable relationships.

This volume brings together new research on the topic of epistemic closure from both leading philosophers and emerging voices in epistemology. It connects epistemic closure principles to related themes in epistemology such as scepticism, dogmatism, evidentialism, epistemic logic, and modal epistemology.Epistemic closure is of central importance to contemporary epistemology, so much so that no epistemology is complete without an answer to the question of where it stands on the issue. The chapters in this book touch on the central themes of closure and transmission and argue for and against different closure and transmission principles. The contributors address issues such as whether knowledge and justification are closed under deductive entailment; whether scepticism can be properly contained by restricting closure principles; whether justification for a set of premises can fail to transmit across inference to a conclusion; Moore's Paradox; and which theories of knowledge-contextualism, contrastivism, or relevant alternatives epistemology-emerge from denying closure.New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology.

There are arguably moral, legal and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address these closely related questions from a variety of new angles.

This is the first book devoted to the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Its essays advance debates on propositional and doxastic justification and explore how such thinking shapes a range of established and emerging topics in contemporary epistemology.

This book features original essays by leading epistemologists that address questions related to epistemic dilemmas from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles.

This is the first book dedicated to the topic of epistemic autonomy. It features original essays from leading scholars that promise to significantly shape future debates in this emerging area of epistemology.

This volume provides a framework for approaching and understanding mental normativity. It presents cutting-edge research on the ethics of belief as well as innovative research beyond the normativity of belief-and towards an ethics of mind.

This collection is the first book-length examination of the various epistemological issues underlying legal trials. Assessing the value of trials as truth-seeking endeavors requires that we consider a host of underlying social epistemological questions. The contributors to this volume address a number of these pressing questions.

This is the first book to explore the connections and interactions between social epistemology and epistemic relativism. By bringing together these two strands of epistemology, this volume offers unique perspectives on a number of central epistemological questions.

This book discusses current challenges in moral epistemology through the lens of higher-order evidence. Fueled by recent advances in empirical research, higher-order evidence has generated a wealth of insights about the genealogy of moral beliefs. This volume explores how these insights impact the epistemic status of moral beliefs.

Epistemological theories of knowledge and justification draw a crucial distinction between one's simply having good reasons for some belief, and one's actually basing one's belief on good reasons. This book brings together leading epistemologists to explore the epistemic basing relation.

This is the first volume dedicated solely to the topic of epistemological disjunctivism. It addresses the historical background of epistemological disjunctivism, tackles a number contemporary issues related to epistemological disjunctivism, and extends the framework of epistemological disjunctivism to other forms of knowledge.

This collection takes on the task of expanding this exploration into new areas. It discusses how the practical might encroach on all areas of our epistemic lives from the way we think about belief, confidence, probability, and evidence to our ideas about epistemic value and excellence.

This book brings together philosophers to investigate the nature and normativity of group disagreement across a range of political, religious, social, and scientific issues.

This volume features new perspectives on the implications of cross-linguistic and cultural diversity for epistemology. It brings together philosophers, linguists, and scholars working on knowledge traditions to advance work in epistemology that moves beyond the Anglophone sphere.

There are arguably moral, legal and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address these closely related questions from a variety of new angles.